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Abstract
Video tampering detection remains an open problem in the field of digital media forensics. As video manipulation
techniques advance, it becomes easier for tamperers to create convincing forgeries that can fool human eyes. Deep learning
methods have already shown great promise in discovering effective features from data, particularly in the image domain;
however, they are exceptionally data hungry. Labelled datasets of varied, state-of-the-art, tampered video which are large
enough to facilitate machine learning do not exist and, moreover, may never exist while the field of digital video
manipulation is advancing at such an unprecedented pace. Therefore, it is vital to develop techniques which can be trained
on authentic or synthesised video but used to localise the patterns of manipulation within tampered videos. In this paper, we
developed a framework for tampering detection which derives features from authentic content and utilises them to localise
key frames and tampered regions in three publicly available tampered video datasets. We used convolutional neural
networks to estimate quantisation parameter, deblock setting and intra/inter mode of pixel patches from an H.264/AVC
sequence. Extensive evaluation suggests that these features can be used to aid localisation of tampered regions within
video.
Keywords CNN  Compression  Video tampering detection  Deep learning
1 Introduction
Automated video analysis is an increasingly important area
of research. Video content creates a unique visual record,
but not all aspects of video content are apparent to human
eyes and this is of particular relevance in today’s age of
fake news and falsified video. Machine learning techniques
are already used to alter video content by changing weather
conditions via style transfer [1] or by performing digital re-
enactment [2, 3]. In discriminating between authentic
content and digital re-enactment using recent techniques,
human assessors did little better than random guessing [4].
There is an increasing urgency to develop techniques to
detect evidence of video processing even when it is
invisible to human eyes. This raises the important question:
How do we develop useful features for visual data when we
might not be able to perceive such features using our own
biological sensors? Deep learning provides a good tool kit
for feature discovery from data; however, it is necessarily
data hungry. In fields such as video tampering, a large,
labelled and sufficiently varied dataset which encompasses
multiple examples from many recent techniques does not
yet exist, although [4] and its recent successor [5] show
great promise. In fast moving fields, a complete dataset
may never exist as, in the time taken to gather and label the
data, many more new and improved techniques will be
discovered. Therefore, we must develop new techniques to
exploit features common to many data examples.
Video compression is prevalent in digital society. The
vast majority of online video has been compressed using
lossy formats such as H.264/AVC [6] or MPEG2 [7].
Compression formats have been designed with the human
visual system in mind, and the effects remain largely below
the threshold of detection for human eyes. It has been
shown that compression does impact classification perfor-
mance of convolutional neural network (CNN) classifiers
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[8, 9] and pre-existing compression in original source
images may have caused these effects to be understated.
CNN classifiers are passively affected by compression;
therefore, it is reasonable to use them to actively detect the
level of compression directly from pixels. Moreover,
accurate estimation of compression parameters, such as
quantisation, could be used to enhance the performance of
CNN classifiers across differing quality levels.
Video tampering techniques are growing at an
unprecedented rate [10]. Detection methods can be active
or passive [11, 12], but, since many existing videos are
unwatermarked at source, passive detection methods are
more applicable. Passive tampering detection can be cate-
gorised into recompression, region tampering and inter-
frame forgery [11]. Region tampering includes copy–move
attacks where copied regions can come from the same
frame in the video, similar to image copy–move [13] or
from a different frame in the same video [14]. Variations
on region tampering include: splicing where content from
two different sources is spliced together and inpainting
where an object or region is removed from the sequence
and the removal concealed. Inter-frame forgery is where an
integer number of frames is added, deleted or reordered.
Regardless of the editing method, however, any tampering
at the pixel level of a compressed video requires recom-
pression of the video bitstream [15, 16], and detection of
compression parameters from the pixels themselves will
evidence recompression. Compression parameters can
provide underlying evidence of how a video has been
processed. For example, two videos might exhibit different
compression parameter distributions which remain in evi-
dence when they are spliced together.
An intuitive indication of recompression is where the
Quantisation Parameter (QP) encoded within the bitstream
fails to match the value estimated from the pixels. This is
most obvious to human eyes when the bitrate and syntax
elements of the bitstream imply high-quality video data,
but the pixel content exhibits visible compression artifacts
such as blockiness. Accurate QP estimation from pixels
may also aid tampering detection in other ways such as key
frame identification and QP distribution analysis. In order
for this to happen, objective methods of measuring QP
directly from video sequence pixels are required. An ideal
QP estimator would also operate accurately over small
patches to enable localisation of tampered regions which is
an advancing area of research [12, 17]. For singly com-
pressed frames, estimated QP can be verified by encoded
bitstream syntax elements. In multiply compressed video,
there will be mismatches between estimated QP and syntax
elements, and differing QP patterns may be detected over
spatially or temporally tampered regions.
This work extends the work in [18] and takes a step
towards utilising compression parameters derived directly
from the pixels themselves. The main contributions are:
• We show CNNs can be trained to estimate different
compression parameters such as quantisation parameter,
intra- or inter-frame type and deblocking filter setting
for standalone sequence patches with reasonable
accuracy.
• We combine our CNN models along with frame deltas
to identify key frames in encoded sequences. Perfor-
mance is evaluated on singly and doubly compressed
sequences with varying bitrates.
• We use our CNN models on existing tampered video
datasets [4, 19, 20] to demonstrate that some tampered
video sequences, particularly spliced content, exhibit
distinct compression profiles and that these can be used
to localise tampered regions.
2 Related work
There are a number of challenges in the detection of
tampered video. Although tampering detectors exist, these
are often tailored to specific tampering techniques. The
authors of [4] produced one of the largest manipulated
datasets to date, based exclusively on the digital re-enact-
ment strategy of [3]. A deep neural network was success-
fully trained to detect manipulated video content with less
than 1% error where humans did little better than guessing,
but it was shown in [21] that this learning does not nec-
essarily transfer readily to other video manipulation
methods. In their recent paper reviewing video content
authentication techniques, Singh and Aggarwal [15] noted
that there is no consistent database of realistically doctored
videos. A large dataset specifically for image rebroadcast
detection was produced in [22]. They demonstrated how
previous techniques, which had achieved good results on
small, specific datasets, were significantly outperformed on
this large, diverse dataset by a CNN, which obtained over
97% accuracy in determining which images had been
rebroadcast and which were authentic. Manipulation tech-
niques are currently more powerful than detection tech-
niques [23], with many ways to digitally alter an image or
video but relatively few methods to detect such manipu-
lations. There is therefore a need to develop detection
techniques that are independent of the type of video
manipulation.
Machine learning techniques are evidently very good at
discovering consistencies and patterns within data and used
to detect tampering [4, 22], but novel techniques are
required to fulfil their large data requirements. In [23], a
Siamese neural network was used to identify whether pixel
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patches exhibited consistent image metadata and could,
therefore, have come from the same image pipeline and be
part of the same authentic image. The network was trained
using only authentic images and their associated EXIF
metadata, so a large dataset could be gathered quickly and
simply. Using 80 features from EXIF metadata and 3 fur-
ther processing techniques (JPEG compression level,
Gaussian blur and re-scaling), the authors managed to
classify whether two 128 9 128 pixel patches were con-
sistent with each other and thus achieve a new state of the
art in image tampering localisation.
While image metadata are often available in online
image files, authentic video metadata are not as readily
available. Video files are much larger and will often be
edited or compressed and recompressed for storage or
streaming purposes. Recompression can also mask tam-
pering, but some evidence can remain. Any processing can
leave a forensic fingerprint on the pixels of a video
sequence. Analysing this fingerprint can provide evidence
of video tampering, such as splicing, inpainting or inter-
frame tampering. Here we look specifically at aspects of
video compression that can usefully contribute towards this
fingerprint. In uncompressed video, sensor pattern noise
can be utilised to identify a camera model as in [24], and
identification of two different camera models in the same
frame can be used to infer tampered video. Shullani et al.
[25] compiled a dataset of authentic video and found that
sensor pattern noise was affected by the compression
applied by two different social media platforms. Moreover,
the two different social media platforms (YouTube and
WhatsApp) had different effects on the data, implying that
their compression mechanisms are distinct from each other.
In [26], elements of compression, such as macroblock
compression type, were used to detect inter-frame tam-
pering. Using machine learning techniques, deleted frames
in an MPEG-2 encoded video sequence were detected with
95% accuracy. However, given that the compression fea-
tures were extracted directly from the bitstream itself, [26]
could be simply defeated via recompression. This paper
aims to overcome that challenge by estimating compres-
sion parameters directly from the pixels. These patterns are
then used to identify areas of inconsistency which could
infer video tampering.
The human visual system is adequate to detect some
compression effects and can quantify ‘‘no reference’’
quality [27, 28]. The source of video compression visual
effects can be found by examining transformations used in
compression standards. A video sequence comprises key
(intra-) frames, which provide access points into the
sequence, and predicted (inter-) frames which rely on data
from previously encoded frames. Key frames contain more
data than predicted frames and are sometimes compressed
more to meet bit rate requirements, occasionally resulting
in visible artifacts. As noted in [11], many inter-frame
tampering detection methods assume perfectly periodic key
frames and struggle to detect tampering that aligns with
key frames. Identification of key frames directly from
pixels is a strong feature in inter-frame tampering detec-
tion, but intra/inter decisions are not only made at the
frame level.
In H.264/AVC and MPEG-2, frames are further divided
into macroblocks which are blocks of 16 9 16 pixels. Each
macroblock can be intra- or inter-coded. Intra-frames can
only contain intra-macroblocks, but inter-frames can con-
tain both intra- and inter-macroblocks. For non-predicted
data, the pixel data itself are transformed into the frequency
domain using Discrete Cosine Transforms (DCTs), quan-
tised and variable length encoded for transmission. For
predicted data, a suitable patch of reference pixels is
located; then, the difference between current and reference
data is transformed, quantised and encoded. Quantisation is
performed as in Eq. 1 where d is DCT coefficients of a
macroblock or residual, C is the compressed coefficients
and Qs represents the quantisation step as indexed by the
quantisation parameter [29].
C ¼ round d
Qs
 
ð1Þ
Higher QP indexes larger Qs and means more frequency
coefficients are filtered out entirely. An increase in QP
often manifests visually as an increased ‘‘blockiness’’, that
is, discrete regions of macroblocks consisting single or few
frequency coefficients. Most often, low frequencies have
higher signal amplitudes, so sharp edges persist while
textures are reduced. In key frames, macroblock edges
align uniformly within the frame. This visual effect was
more apparent in earlier video compression standards [7]
where non-integer DCTs forced regular inclusion of key
frames. Periodic key frames limited rounding error drift
between encoder and decoder but were sometimes visible
as a pulse in the sequence as accumulated rounding errors
were reset. The integer transforms introduced in H.264/
AVC [6] reduced the role of key frames to access points in
the bitstream and consequently reduced the periodic pulse
in video sequences. HEVC [30] defines other techniques to
reduce visible compression artifacts but is yet to be fully
adopted. H.264/AVC is more common in the wild. Com-
pression artifacts are not restricted to artificial block edges,
however, and can also manifest as a lack of specific fre-
quency detail or as banding in areas of smooth colour/
intensity transition.
As noted in [11], many inter-frame tampering detection
methods struggle to detect tampering that aligns with key
frames. Methods fail when a complete Group of Pictures
(GOP) from one key frame to the next is deleted, added or
temporally moved. It can be deduced from this that these
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techniques ultimately rely on a detected mismatch between
key frames identified using features from the pixels and
either those derived directly from bitstream syntax ele-
ments, or those estimated from assumed encoder beha-
viour. It is clear from this that there are some differences
between intra- and predicted frames in video compression.
As part of an investigation into using deep neural net-
works to determine image quality, Bosse et al. [27]
developed a method to estimate QP of HEVC frames
directly from pixels. They achieved accurate results for
average QP estimation over a complete frame using a
patch-wise technique and dataset synthesised from UCID
[31]. The method was applied to key frames only. QP
estimation was framed as a regression problem, and the
dataset used to train the network contained labelled patches
compressed with all possible QPs. Although averaged QP
prediction for a complete frame was accurate, a heatmap
showing individual patch contributions displayed great
variation between patches.
This work examines QP estimation in the context of
patches taken from H.264/AVC video sequences. We also
look at identification of key frames from the pixels them-
selves. H.264/AVC is currently one of the most popular
video compression standards and is used on YouTube,
broadcast video and public datasets. A CNN is trained to
classify frame patches from a video sequence using their
quantisation parameters as labels. Unlike [27], we also
investigate whether these features can be used to detect
tampering in videos.
3 Proposed framework
The full framework is summarised in Fig. 1. In order to
implement the framework, the following techniques are
required:
• CNNs trained to estimate QP, inter/intra frame mode
and sequence deblocking filters from the pixels
• A method to calculate frame deltas
• A method to identify key frames
• A method to localise tampering
These techniques are detailed in the following subsections.
First, we use authentic data to train CNN feature detectors.
Then we use these feature detectors to express pixel pat-
ches from a video sequence as feature vectors. We use key
frames only to increase the efficacy of the CNN com-
pression feature detectors. The feature vectors are then
clustered in to two clusters using k-means clustering [32].
This assumes that there are two different distributions
present in the data, representing authentic and tampered
data, and our experimental evaluation shows that this is a
valid assumption for some tampered data.
3.1 Authentic datasets for CNN training
When examining the effects of compression, it is vital to
start with unprocessed data. Standard YUV 4:2:0 sequen-
ces from xiph.org are commonly used for video compres-
sion quality analysis.1 Strictly speaking, YUV 4:2:0 is a
compressed format due to reduced colour channel resolu-
tion; however, it is widely used as a starting format in
video compression. The sequences from xiph.org come in
various dimensions and cover a wide variety of subjects
from studio-shot sequences to outdoor scenes. All
sequences are single camera, continuous scenes with
varying degrees of camera motion.
A large amount of data are required to train a neural
network, and uncorrelated data will produce a more gen-
eralised network. It is possible to use still image data as
single frame sequences when focussing on spatial com-
pression artifacts and excluding temporal compression. For
this purpose, the images of UCID [31] were used. UCID
consists of uncompressed images which are either 512 9
384 pixels or 384 9 512 pixels and cover a wide variety of
subject matter. All are natural scenes and taken with the
same camera. Of the original reported 1338 images in the
dataset, only 882 were available.2 Using a dataset of single
images is not ideal since predicted frames cannot be
examined. However, it allows for a greater variety of pixel
combinations in a smaller dataset because individual ima-
ges are uncorrelated. Each image from UCID was regarded
as a single frame video sequence.
Following [18], we process the video using various
compression parameters to synthesise a number of original
datasets summarised in Table 1. Each video sequence was
compressed using the open-source H.264/AVC encoder
x264 and one of a range of constant QP levels using
variable bitrate mode. Constant quantisation parameters
were selected with an even distribution: QP = [0, 7, 14, 21,
Fig. 1 Summary of the proposed framework
1 Available from Derf’s Media Collection: https://media.xiph.org/
video/derf.
2 UCID images from http://jasoncantarella.com/downloads/ucid.v2.
tar.gz.
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28, 35, 42, 49]. Constant bitrate rate control and psycho-
visual options were turned off. Deblocking filter was set as
specified in Table 1. For datasets containing predicted
frames, the key frame interval was 250. Patches were then
extracted from the decoded YUV 4:2:0 sequences and
upsampled from YUV 4:2:0 to YUV 4:4:4.
Table 2 summarises synthesised datasets. A large tem-
poral stride was used to limit correlation between patches
from the same video sequence. Consecutive frames are
similar to each other, and a neural network trained with
correlated dataset will be subject to overfitting. All datasets
were prepared in advance of network training, and the
original video sequences were split into disjoint train and
test sets prior to compression and patch sampling to pre-
vent data leakage.3 The images of UCID were encoded as
intra-frames and used as supplemental data to AllIntra.
A patch size of 80 9 80 pixels was used. Block edge
artifacts in intra-frames will present themselves at mac-
roblock (and sub-block) boundaries. Therefore, any patch
size larger than 16 9 16 will capture block edges. In [27], a
small patch size of 32 9 32 was selected, but results in [18]
showed that a larger patch size yielded more accurate local
results. When aligned with the macroblock grid, 80 9 80
pixels covers 5 9 5 complete macroblocks. A larger patch
size allows for more context and image features within the
patch to contribute towards feature classification. Spatial
strides were selected so that there was no patch overlap in
the training set, although patches taken from the same
video sequence would exhibit some correlation.
Each dataset in Table 2 consists of a number of YUV
4:4:4 patches, each labelled appropriately. QP was labelled
according to the quantisation parameter. The inter- or intra-
labels depended only on the frame type, and not on
individual macroblocks. The deblocking filter setting was
done on a sequence level. From each of these synthesised
datasets, a neural network was trained to perform classifi-
cation according to the label.
3.2 Network architecture
In [18], three different network architectures (NAs) were
examined for one compression parameter (QP). Here, one
fully convolutional architecture was used, similar to the
architecture used in [33] which obtained particularly good
results on CASIA2 [34]. CASIA2 is known to suffer from
asymmetric image processing between tampered and non-
tampered image classes [35]; therefore, this network
architecture is already known to perform well in detecting
image processing. Each network was trained on only one
compression parameter, yielding three sets of network
weights, one each for QP, deblock and inter/intra.
The architecture used was: conv595-30, norm,
pool292, conv393-16, conv393-16, conv393-16, norm,
pool292, conv393-16, conv393-16, softmax. A stride of 2
for convolutions allowed sufficient overlap to encounter
compression artifacts while reducing the number of net-
work parameters. Image patches of format YUV 4:4:4 were
scaled to values between 0 and 1 and whitened. In order to
preserve compression artifacts in situ, no further data
augmentation were used. Batch size was 128 patches.
Adam was used for gradient descent [36] in the quantisa-
tion parameter network and stochastic gradient descent for
the intra/inter and deblock features. The networks were
implemented using TensorFlow.
3.3 CNN compression parameter estimation
accuracy
The quantisation parameter (QP) in H.264/AVC can be
expressed as:
0QP 52; QP 2 R ð2Þ
Table 1 Uncompressed,
authentic datasets for
synthesising compression
features
Name Source Length Dimensions Key frame Deblock
AllVid xiph.org 45 videos 176 9 144 to 1920 9 1080 1/250 Off
AllIntra xiph.org 45 videos 176 9 144 to 1920 9 1080 All Off
AllDeblock xiph.org 45 videos 176 9 144 to 1920 9 1080 1/250 On
UCID UCID [31] 882 images 512 9 384 or 384 9 512 All O
Table 2 Patch datasets used for
learning compression features
Name Source Label # Train # Test
IntraForQP AllIntra QP 764,640 56,392
Intra0vsInter1 AllIntra, AllVid I ¼ 0;P ¼ 1 836,512 12,992
Deblock1 AllDeblock, AllVid Deblock = 0.1 836,512 12,992
3 Training sequences: akiyo, bridge-close, bridge-far, carphone,
claire, coastguard, foreman, hall, highway, mobile, mother-daughter,
paris, silent, stefan, tennis, waterfall, old_town_cross, crowd_run,
ducks_take_off, in_to_tree, mobcal, old_town_cross, parkrun, shields.
Test sequences: bus, flower, news, tempete.
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QP relates directly to Qs in Eq. 1. Patches with similar QP
labels exhibit similar compression features, and confusion
matrices produced by the network reflected this. Different
QPs might have very similar effects on a given patch,
depending on patch content. A patch of solid colour, for
example, transforms to a single high amplitude, low fre-
quency coefficient which is nonzero on quantisation. Such
an extreme example is unlikely in natural scenes, but it
demonstrates how applying close QPs might result in
identical patches with different labels. Therefore, QP was
restricted to [0, 7, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49] in the synthesised
datasets. Using all possible QP would generate an extre-
mely large dataset with more potential for ambiguous
examples and increase model training times. Another
source of ambiguity is the presence of skipped mac-
roblocks. In simple terms, a skipped macroblock in a pre-
dicted frame is identical to the reference macroblock in the
reference frame. This means that there may exist some
predicted regions whose pixel content is identical to
regions in a key frame. Using larger patch sizes decreases
this risk.
3.4 Key frame detection
One thing evident in [18] was that accurate estimation of
quantisation parameters in predicted frames is challenging.
This is because quantisation is applied to the difference
between the motion compensated macroblock from previ-
ous encoded frames and the current macroblock. If this
residual is unknown, as in the case where only the pixels
can be relied on, then it is difficult to estimate the quan-
tisation parameter. In order to avoid such challenges, it was
decided to identify and process only key frames.
A large percentage of compression in video comes from
predicted frames. It is much more efficient to compress the
differences between frames than it is to compress every
single frame in isolation. With the advent of integer
transforms in standard compression codecs, periodic key
frames are no longer required to correct transform rounding
error accumulation. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that key frames are in the minority in a video sequence.
Moreover, because non-predicted frames are inherently
larger than predicted frames and rate control mechanisms
attempt to avoid peaks in bitrates, key frames are often
compressed using a higher QP than predicted frames. Key
frames can also exhibit more block artifacts than predicted
frames. This can be used to distinguish key frames from
predicted frames.
To identify key frames, we first estimated the quanti-
sation parameter qp, the inter/intra parameter ip and the
deblocking parameter db for patches in every frame of a
sequence. The patches were 80 9 80 pixels and separated
by a stride of 16 pixels (overlapping). Patch values for qp,
ip and deblock were then averaged over each frame in a
sequence and the differences between the averages taken.
The three different predictions were then combined as in
Eq. 3
af ¼ ðqpf  qpf1Þ  ðipf  ipf1Þ  ðdbf  dbf1Þ ð3Þ
where qpf represents the average CNN predicted quanti-
sation parameter for frame f and qpf1 is the same
parameter for the previous frame. Key frames were then
defined as any frame where the value of af was more than
two standard deviations from the mean of af .
3.5 Datasets for tampering detection
Three publicly available datasets were used for evaluation:
FaceForensics [4], D’Avino et al. [19] and Video Tam-
pering Dataset (VTD) [20].
FaceForensics [4] is a large, tampered video dataset
consisting over 1000 videos where content is restricted to
talking heads, including news readers, with minimum
dimensions of 480p and 300 frames. The authentic source
videos were originally scraped from YouTube, and the
tampered sequences use a variant of Face2Face [3]. Every
tampered video has an authentic counterpart, and the video
sequences are supplied as losslessly compressed files. For
these experiments, only the first frame of each of the
sequences in the test set was used. Once the dataset was
divided into patches, it exhibited a large imbalance with
only 3% positive samples. In order to create an additional,
balanced dataset, crops of the tampered areas and corre-
sponding authentic areas were created by using the dif-
ference between related authentic and tampered sequences.
Areas outside of the crops are pixel-wise identical between
tampered and authentic content.
The dataset provided by D’Avino et al. [19] consists of
10 spliced videos. The sequences are all 720p and 281–488
frames in length. Each sequence is a single camera, con-
tinuous scene, although the camera is not static in all
sequences and some sequences are subject to significant
camera motion. The dataset provides uncompressed .avi
video files for original, forged and binary mask for each
sequence; however, the source videos used to create splices
have been compressed in the past and evidence of com-
pression can be found in the pixels (see Sect. 4.3). Again,
the dataset has a large imbalance, with 4.2% of all patch
samples labelled tampered. Original background videos
were filmed by the authors, but content for chroma-keyed
regions was obtained from YouTube. The dataset has been
benchmarked by the authors using an auto-encoder-based
method. The auto-encoder is trained on a short sequence of
authentic frames so that predictions made by the auto-
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encoder showed the greatest deviation in tampered regions.
Our method does not require any authentic frames.
VTD [20] comprises 26 forged sequences and their 26
authentic counterparts. There are also 7 authentic sequen-
ces in the dataset, but these were discarded. The tampered
video files comprise 10 sequences of spatio-temporal copy–
move, 6 inter-frame tampering (frame shuffling) and 10
spliced sequences. The sequences are between 420 and 480
frames in length and are all available in 720p, barring a
single 420p sequence. Some sequences contain cut scenes,
and there is evidence of non-motion compensated resam-
pling within the dataset, which implies that source videos
were not pristine. The dataset is distributed via a YouTube
channel and, as such, is subject to recompression. The
videos were downloaded from YouTube selecting the
highest possible bitrate and frame dimensions, and the
average bitrate was 1.7 Mbps, which equates to a com-
pression rate of 0.06 bits per pixel (bpp). Recompression
itself makes mask extraction noisy and tampering locali-
sation particularly challenging. The lack of mask provision
for this dataset also highlights the somewhat philosophical
question of whether a pixel which remains unchanged
between authentic and tampered sequences, yet forms part
of a tampered object, is considered tampered or not.
However, data from the compressed bitstream are also
available, allowing accurate identification of key frames
from the most recent (YouTube) compression. VTD is, as
yet, unbenchmarked.
For VTD, masks were extracted using a thresholded
difference between each frame of the forged and corre-
sponding authentic sequences. Pixels with a difference
higher than the threshold were labelled tampered, and those
below labelled authentic. Thresholds in the range 0–64
were selected manually for each sequence. The mask pixels
were then filtered temporally, using majority vote across 3
frames consecutive frames to remove erroneous compres-
sion noise. Finally, morphological operations were applied
to each mask frame for further clean up. Using these
masks, less than 2% of dataset patches were labelled
tampered.
3.6 Localisation of tampering
Tampering was localised within detected key frames only
and used only predicted QP and frame deltas. Frame deltas
were calculated for 16 9 16 pixel patches to correspond
with the QP prediction values. The frame delta value was
set to 1 whenever the mean absolute difference of a given
16 9 16 pixel patch and the co-located patch in the pre-
vious frame was nonzero, and set to zero otherwise.
Unsupervised clustering was used to group feature
vectors representing pixel patches into one of two groups.
For VTD and D’Avino, these feature vectors consisted
predicted QP and frame deltas. For the datasets based on
FaceForensics, frame deltas were unavailable, given that
only the first frame in the sequence was used. Therefore, all
three compression features were used in the feature vector.
The resulting clusters were nominatively labelled ‘‘au-
thentic’’ or ‘‘tampered’’. Given that some tampered video
content is simply two or more authentic videos spliced
together, these labels could be effectively switched to more
closely match the ground truth on sequences containing
spliced data.
For assessment, Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC,
Eq. 4) and F1 score (Eq. 5) were used. MCC provides a
score between 1 and 1 where 0 represents uncorrelated
data, 1 is completely correlated data and 1 is completely
inversely correlated. This is particularly useful for when
classes can be flipped as in the case for spliced video.
MCC ¼ TP TN  FP FNﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃðTPþ FPÞðTPþ FNÞðTN þ FPÞðTN þ FNÞp
ð4Þ
F1 ¼ 2TP
2TPþ FN þ FP ð5Þ
Both of these metrics focus mainly on true positives and
are relatively unsuitable for detection of inter-frame tam-
pering. To account for this, we have used only the intra-
frame tampered sequences of VTD. They are also both
subject to class imbalance.
4 Experimentation and discussion
Results indicate that CNNs can be trained to achieve a
reasonable level of accuracy in determining three com-
pression parameters directly from pixels and that this
accuracy is sufficient to identify key frames and aid
localisation of tampering in some sequences. This
demonstrates how authentic video can be used to fulfil the
large data requirement of deep learning techniques even
when the application is the detection of forged video.
4.1 CNN compression parameter estimation
The three trained CNNs achieved the accuracies listed in
Table 3. Training a network to detect compression
Table 3 CNN results
Trained to classify Number of classes Accuracy (%)
QP 8 71.18
Inter/Intra 2 69.23
Deblock 2 66.53
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parameters directly from pixels will always be subject to
some degree of error. Not all pixel regions in natural
images will evidence all relevant frequencies necessary to
unambiguously assign a given compression parameter.
This effect can be seen in the confusion matrix (Fig. 2).
The network incorrectly labels some lightly compressed
patches as heavily compressed, and this is likely due to a
natural lack of high frequencies in those regions. Similarly
for the inter/intra network, we label on the frame level, not
on the macroblock level. It is possible for some pixels to
remain unchanged between key and predicted frames due
to skipped macroblocks. With regard to the deblock filter,
although it is set on or off on a sequence level, the
parameters which control the level of filtering on individual
macroblocks are controlled by motion vectors. All of these
factors contribute to ambiguity in the labels for individual
macroblocks, but are sufficiently evened out over a patch
size of 80 80 pixels to achieve a workable level of
accuracy. This is shown in Fig. 3 where the average esti-
mated QP for the complete frame is accurate, but indi-
vidual regions display some variance. In particular, the
white sky region is allocated a relatively high QP,
demonstrating a lack of high frequency coefficients.
4.2 Key frame identification
The key frame identification was performed as in Sect. 3.4.
Because it is based on outliers, this method of key frame
identification assumes at least one key frame in the
sequence, other than the initial frame. Key frames occur
when specified by the compression encoder. Cut scenes
will sometimes trigger the encoding of a key frame, how-
ever not always, and not all key frames occur on cut scenes.
Frame differences can sometimes indicate key frames, but
they are not reliable as can be seen by comparing Figs. 4
and 5.
To gauge its efficacy, the method of key frame identi-
fication was tested on a number of sequences which com-
prised compressed and recompressed versions of YUV test
sequences. These were first compressed with the open
source encoder x264 using different bitrates (0.01, 0.02,
0.05, 0.1, 0.2 bpp) and an intra-frame frequency of 1/30.
The resulting compressed sequences were then recom-
pressed using the same bitrates but an intra-frame fre-
quency of 1/25. It was found that the method performed
very well at bitrates of 0.02–0.2 bpp in identifying the key
frame from the latest compression. This is shown by the
graph for single compression and the line for the second
compression in the graph of double compression in Fig. 6.
Below bitrates of 0.02 bpp, the visual video quality was
very poor and the predicted quantisation parameter started
to saturate to its highest level, leading to inaccuracies in
key frame identification. Above bitrates of 0.2 bpp, the
predicted quantisation parameter did not saturate, but
accuracy still dropped. It is probable that the reduced
accuracy was due to rate control choices made in the x264
encoder. With a higher bitrate available, peaks in bitrate
due to key frames are comparatively reduced. Therefore, it
becomes more efficient to encode key frames with higher
quality, yielding more accurate reference frames and con-
sequently reducing the bits required for predicted frames.
Recompression at bitrates below 0.1 bpp effectively cam-
ouflaged key frames from the previous compression. As
bitrates of the second compression process increased, evi-
dence of key frames from the previous compression pro-
cess emerged, as can be seen by the rise in the ‘‘first
compression i-frames’’ F1 score graph.
The method of identifying key frames was then applied
to the VTD dataset. It should be noticed that our method
was effective at bitrates corresponding to those of VTD. As
can be seen in the graphs in Fig. 7, combining predicted
QP, inter/intra and deblocking values as in Eq. 3 provided
a clear indication of key frames in the latest compression.
Using the frame averaged mean absolute difference
between frames yielded noisy results and did not accurately
identify key frames. Comparing the key frames identified
using this method with those extracted from the bitstreams
of the forged sequences of VTD [20] achieved 87 true
positives out of a total of 93 key frames. There were 27
false positives, giving an F1 score of 0.84. The majority of
false positives (16 false positives) came from two
sequences: ‘‘Forgery cake cooking’’ and ‘‘Forgery Awe-
some Cuponk’’ which both contain ‘‘fade’’ cut scenes.
‘‘Forgery cake cooking’’ also contains evidence of tem-
poral upsampling from 25 fps to 30 fps. The robustness of
this method of i-frame detection against temporal upsam-
pling has not been investigated, and this is left for future
work. Since spatially non-uniform temporal upsampling
Fig. 2 Confusion matrix for QP-trained network
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would be indicative of video splicing, a method to detect it
would prove useful.
The i-frame detection method was also applied to
D’Avino et al’s dataset [19]. Although the dataset is sup-
plied as uncompressed .avi files, the i-frame detector pro-
vided evidence of previous compression by locating
regular key frames at approximately 30 frame intervals.
4.3 Tampering detection analysis
In order to first show that predicted compression parame-
ters can be used to locate tampering in video frames, we
first examine the profiles of the different datasets. Table 4
shows predicted QP, averaged over the regions defined by
the binary tampered mask. The last column in Table 4
shows the absolute difference in average QP per sequence
averaged over all sequences. It can be seen that there is a
distinct difference in QP averaged over authentic and
tampered regions, particularly for the spliced content of
[19] and the digitally manipulated content of [4], where the
average absolute difference is larger than the granularity of
the QP classifier. Figure 8a shows the predicted QP class
distribution for sequence ‘‘08_TREE’’ [19], showing that
authentic regions and spliced regions display different
quantisation parameter distributions. The tampered con-
tent, in this instance, has a lower QP while the authentic
content displays higher QP. The sequences of [19] consist
of authentic content filmed on hand-held camera phones
and green screen plates.4 It can be deduced that, for this
sequence, the hand-held cameras produced video of a lower
quality than the green screen plates, resulting in distinct
Fig. 3 QP heatmap for test
sequence ‘‘flowers’’, QP = 35.
The heatmap gives an average
prediction of QP = 35, but there
is some variation between
individual regions
158 159 160 161
Fig. 4 Frames 158–161 of sequence ‘‘forgery CCTV_London_Str’’
[20], showing (top to bottom) sequence, binary frame difference for
16 16 blocks (black = no difference, white = differences) and QP
prediction using a trained neural network. Frame differences clearly
indicate the key frame, even though it is not visible in the sequence.
The key frame is frame 160
4 Some spliced content of [19] came from https://www.hollywoodca
merawork.com/green-screen-plates.html.
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differences in QP distribution. Figure 8b shows the QP
distributions over the first frames of FaceForensics, with
the tampered points upsampled to equalise the dataset
imbalance. It can be seen that, in general, tampered regions
are compressed more lightly than authentic ones. Figure 9
demonstrates this further by displaying the QP heatmaps
over some examples. It can be clearly seen that the tam-
pered facial regions display lower QP than the authentic
regions.
The copy–move content of VTD does not display a
marked difference in predicted QP parameters because all
copy–move content comes from within the same sequence
and hence same QP distribution as shown in Fig. 8c. The
difference for spliced content of VTD is slightly higher, but
not significant enough for our CNN QP predictor to
ascertain which distribution individual regions come from.
The training set for our QP predictor used QP steps of 7,
and the difference between spliced and authentic content of
VTD is smaller than this. This effect may be due to the
recompression step in the processing of this video: if the
quality of both spliced and authentic content was reduced
during recompression, then any differences in QP distri-
bution will be consequently smoothed.
158 159 160 161
Fig. 5 Frames 158–161 of sequence ‘‘forgery basketball skills’’ [20],
showing (top to bottom) original sequence, binary frame difference
for 16 16 blocks (black = no difference, white = differences) and
QP prediction using a trained neural network. Frame differences do
not always highlight key frames. The key frame is frame 160
Fig. 6 F1 scores for key frame identification in singly and doubly compressed sequences
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Table 5 shows frame deltas (Sect. 3.6) averaged over
regions and sequences. It can be seen that the averaged
frame deltas for the tampered and authentic content of [19]
are very close. There is a much bigger difference in VTD’s
spliced content. This is because some sequences, such as
‘‘Forgery Billiards’’ and ‘‘Forgery Studio’’, simply used
static images as their spliced content. Similarly, some of
the copy–move sequences, such as ‘‘Forgery basketball
skills’’ and ‘‘Forgery 100m swimming’’, also used static
content; however, since the tampered areas are also
relatively static, it is not clear if this is an explicit feature of
the tampering itself or simply of the region that was
tampered.
4.4 Tampering localisation
Using all three compression parameters from the cropped
FaceForensics test patches and unsupervised k-means
clustering, assuming two clusters, we achieved MCC of
0.67 and mean F1 score of 0.81. Clustering could be validly
diﬀs QP I/P deblock all
Fig. 7 Graphs showing differences between the mean value per frame
of each feature for the sequences basketball (top) and cctv [20].
Frame averages versus frame number for (left to right): absolute
frame differences; predicted QP; predicted inter/intra; predicted
deblock; combination as in Eq. 3. The key frames can be clearly
identified as outliers using a combination of the CNN predicted
features
Fig. 8 Predicted QP class distribution for authentic and spliced content in sequence ‘‘08_TREE’’ [19], digital manipulation in FaceForensics [4]
and copy–move content in sequence ‘‘dahua’’ [20]
Table 4 Predicted QP on authentic and tampered pixels in detected key frames
Sequences Average QP (mask = 0) Average QP (mask = 1) Average absolute diff.
FaceForensics [4] (Face2Face) 26.81 11.27 15.54
D’Avino [19] (splice) 19.12 9.44 9.68
VTD [20] (copy–move) 33.26 34.03 3.67
VTD [20] (splice) 32.58 26.98 5.80
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performed over the whole dataset because the tampering
method is the same for all sequences, and the source video
footage all came from a single platform (YouTube).
Unfortunately k-means clustering did not perform as well
with full first frames of FaceForensics, achieving MCC =
0.11, but when this dataset was balanced using random
oversampling, MCC rose to 0.58 with mean F1 over both
classes of 0.76. This clearly demonstrates that there are
dataset imbalance challenges associated with tampering
detection.
Using only frame deltas and predicted QP as features
and forming two clusters using unsupervised k-means
clustering for each sequence, the following were achieved
on D’Avino et al’s dataset [19]: mean MCC: 0.249, mean
F1 score: 0.255. MCC rises to 0.302 if the two lowest
scoring sequences (‘‘07_UFO’’ and ‘‘03_Cat’’) are ignored.
In both these sequences, spliced objects are small relative
to the frame size and occupy few key frames. Moreover,
QP distributions for authentic and tampered regions in
these two sequences are much less distinct that in the other
sequences, and fall under the QP step size of 7 necessary
for our CNN QP predictor.
In all the sequences of [19], key frames were estimated
to occur at an interval of one every 30 frames. While this
dataset is supplied as uncompressed, it is evidently com-
piled from compressed sources and one key frame per
second at a frame rate of 30 fps is relatively standard in
compression. Figure 10 shows example frames for some of
the sequences from [19]. It can be seen that, for these
examples, the quantisation parameters in tampered regions
are generally lower than in authentic content. The results of
the unsupervised k-means clustering, although noisy,
reflect this. It can also be seen that there are a high number
of false positives, and this combined with the dataset
imbalance contributes to the relatively low MCC score.
Fig. 9 Predicted QP is lower in the tampered regions of samples from FaceForensics [4], left to right: authentic pixels, authentic QP heatmap,
tampered pixels, tampered QP heatmap
Table 5 Predicted frame deltas
on authentic and tampered
pixels in detected key frames
(not applicable to FaceForensics
datasets)
Sequences Average diff (mask = 0) Average diff (mask = 1) Average absolute diff.
VTD [20] (copy–move) 0.68 0.43 0.31
VTD [20] (splice) 0.72 0.56 0.32
D’Avino [19] (splice) 0.90 0.92 0.11
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The results on VTD [20] were somewhat less encour-
aging. There are relatively few key frames in many of these
sequences. Where key frames were detected every 30
frames in [19], the most common gap between key frames
in VTD was 160 frames, resulting in only 3 key frames for
over half of the sequences in the dataset. Three sequences
completely lacked key frames coinciding with the tam-
pered region, and these were removed from our analysis.
The use of MCC and F1 scores based on spatial compo-
nents is unsuitable for frame shuffling. Excluding these
sequences, the mean MCC was 0.082 and F1 0.065. This
shows a weak correlation between predicted and actual
tampered areas, which can be partly attributed to recom-
pression causing an equalisation in the QP distribution
between tampered and authentic regions. Although a real-
istic process, recompression of this dataset also resulted in
challenges in extracting accurate tampering masks and this
may also be a contributory factor. The authors of [19] also
noted that YouTube compression had a negative effect on
their auto-encoder-based tampering detector. This high-
lights challenges for tampering detection in video dis-
tributed using one of the most common video sharing
platforms in the world. Further work is needed if tampering
detectors are to thoroughly overcome the challenges of
recompression.
5 Conclusions and future work
With video manipulation techniques currently increasing at
an unprecedented rate, it is vital to develop features that
can detect tampering irrespective of the original tampering
method. A lack of large, current, comprehensive tampered
video datasets makes learning these features from tampered
data impossible; therefore, it is necessary to derive such
features using authentic sources. Video compression pro-
vides a common foundation for video analysis, with the
vast majority of available video sequences compressed in
some format. Moreover, the use of machine learning
techniques and feature discovery from data provides a
methodology which can be used to produce updated fea-
tures should new compression standards fall in to common
use.
We have shown that three features of H.264/AVC
compression, namely quantisation parameter, intra/inter
and deblock modes, can be estimated objectively by CNN.
These features have been used to predict the location of key
frames in a video sequence, where they provide some
advantage over simple frame deltas. They have also been
used to localise spliced regions within the detected key
frames. Results suggest that this type of feature shows great
promise in the work towards universal tampering detection.
Video manipulation causes self-inconsistencies within the
video sequence, whether this is caused by splicing,
inpainting, inter-frame tampering or small, localised
changes used to alter content such as those used in digital
re-enactment. This work shows that with the use of only
four features (QP, inter/intra, deblocking and frame dif-
ferences) derived exclusively from untampered sources,
self-inconsistencies within a video sequence can be
detected and exploited to localise tampering.
Our future work will examine further features that can
be learned from authentic video and used to refine the
localisation of video manipulation. A finer grained quan-
tisation parameter predictor would improve prediction with
the current feature set; however, this might require
Fig. 10 Heatmap for test sequence (top to bottom) ‘‘08_TREE’’, ‘‘05_HEN’’ and ‘‘06_LION’’ from [19]: (left to right) real, fake, ground truth,
clustered data, QP predictions. Darker areas mean lower QP predictions
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migration from spatial to frequency domain. Additional
features to investigate include compression features, par-
ticularly those associated with non-key frames such as
skipped macroblocks and motion vector regions and fea-
tures specific to multiple compressions. Other processing
steps performed by cameras or software in the video pro-
cessing pipeline should also be examined to determine if
these are robust against recompression. We will also work
on a better method to combine these features into a video
manipulation localiser which is robust against multiple
types of tampering.
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